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Strat egic Lobbying: The Nature
of Legislator/Lobbyist Relations
Adam J. Newmark
Appalachian State University
This paper explores lobbying roles based on a survey of lobbyists in ten
states. Lobbyists employ a variety of tactics in their interactions with
legislators that can be characterized along two dimensions, one based
on how personal the relationship is, and the other based on the extent
that information is exchanged between these actors. The findings sugges t that there are only a few good ole boy lobbyists, who rely solely on
pe rsonal appeal strategies . Instead, there is a mix of those who are
amateurs, those that use information based appeal strategies, and those
that appear to use both personal relationships and information-based
app eals in their interactions with legislators. This allows us to examine
the specific activities that lobbyists use in their dealings with legislators, as well as the general appeal strategies that they use.
DIMENSIONALITY OF LEGISLAT OR/L OBBYIST INTERACT IONS

olitical scientists have long recognized that relationships
between legislators and lobbyists are critical to achieving
objectives (Heinz et al. 1993). The good ole boy style of
lobbying best epitomized the use of relationships in these exchanges (Rosenthal 2001). Though there has been wide discussion of the decline in the good ole boy style of lobbying, little
empirical work has examined this decline and what has replaced
it. To what extent has there been a decline in lobbying strategies
that are primarily based on personal appeals? Additionally, as
many scholars have noted, lobbyists are important suppliers of
information to legislators who lack the time, money, and perhaps
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inclination, to research every issue (Kingdon 1973, Matthews
and Stimson 1975). Thus, information is an important commodity for lobbyists to convey to legislators.
Lobbyists are of particular interest to political scientists, the
media, politicians, and other actors given the recent string of
good government reforms in the states (tem1 limits, lobbying and
ethics regulations). In an effort to curb unethical or illegal political behaviors, many states have reformed their lobbying laws
following scandals involving lobbyists and members of the legislature. Another reason to further explore relationships between
lobbyists and legislatures is that much of the literature on interest
group and PAC influence on decision-making is inconclusive in
finding such a linkage (Smith 1995; Baumgartner and Leech
1998). The conflicting findings in this literature may result from
an inadequate understanding of the core relationships between
these political actors.
This paper assesses whether state lobbying tactics are primarily based on personal appeals, information, or a combination
of the two. Scholars owe much to Zeigler and Baer's (1969)
work on amateur and professional lobbying, yet little research
has addressed the nature of the profession beyond classifying
lobbyists by type (contract lobbyist, legislative liaison, or inhouse). 1 These classifications are important, but how these lobbying types use certain appeal strategies and how this fits into
our schema of professionalization needs further attention. The
first portion of the analysis explores the nature and dimensionality of lobbying relationships. That is, what are the defining components of relationships? Next, based on these dimensions,
lobbyists are classified according to the kinds of behaviors typical of the underlying dimensions identified. Finally, I examine
1

For exceptions, see Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Nownes and Freeman (1998a;
1998b), and Thomas and Hrebenar 2004).
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the differences in the typical lobbying strategies employed by
each of these types of lobbyist.
Information Provision and Personal Relationshi ps

Many studies have examined how lobbyists attempt to persuade legislators through information provision (Milbrath 1963;
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Austen-Smith 1993; Wright 1996;
Ainsworth 2002). Early research on lobbying viewed interest
groups as having little influence on legislators, and access to
lawmakers and the policy process was usually limited to those
organizations that had similar views as legislators in the first
place. Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1963), for example, viewed interests as relatively innocuous "service bureaus" with limited
funds and marginal influence. Milbrath's (1963) examination of
contract lobbyists sought to uncover how these actors perceived
the effectiveness of various lobbying tactics. More recently, interest group scholars have pushed the focus on tactics to better
understand the approaches used in dealing with legislators (Berry
1977; Walker 1991; Nownes and Freeman 1998a). Rosenthal
(2001) and Browne (1985) note the importance of access and
interaction in the relationship between lobbyists and legislators.
Termed the "contact game," lobbyists employ a multitude of
strategies to achieve their objectives and facilitate deal-making
(1985).
Schlozman and Tierney (1986), Walker (1991), Kollman
(1998), and Nownes and Freeman (1998a) have also furthered
our understanding of lobbying tactics. Baumgartner and Leech
(1998) summarize these extant findings on interest group and
lobbying tactics suggesting that lobbyists engage in a variety of
activities like giving testimony at hearings, having person-toperson contact, utilizing informal contacts (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Heinz et al. 1993), presenting research (Schlozman
and Tierney 1986; Berry 1977), forming coalitions with other
VOL.
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groups (Hojnacki 1997; Gray and Lowery 1998), serving on advisory boards, and 'contacting agency personnel' (Kollman
1998).2 Nownes and Freeman find that many techniques are used
in lobbying, and they often involve direct contact with legislators, helping to draft legislation, and they "[alert] state legislators
to the effects of a bill on their districts" (1998b, 1190).
The importance of information is also stressed in the voting
cue literature, as we know that lobbyists and interest groups are
critical sources of information for legislators at both the national
(Kingdon 1973; Matthews and Stimson 1975) and state levels
(Ray 1982; Songer et al. 1985; Gray and Lowery 2000). Esterling (2001) found that members of Congress seek out lobbyists
with specialized information, which indicates the importance of
expertise in information provision. Even when the lobbyists are
not the experts, they can provide specialists who may deal directly with legislators or testify before legislative committees (Rosenthal 2001). Lobbyists also possess information on how a
policy or piece of legislation will affect the member's district
and how constituents view such matters (Kingdon 1973; Kollman 1998).
Other scholars have stressed the importance of relationships
and have examined the role of friendships in the legislative
process (Patterson 1959; Matthews 1960; Baker 1980; Jewell
and Patterson 1985; Caldiera and Patterson 1987). Baker (1960)
discusses the inseparable nature of political and personal relationships in the U.S. Senate, and Matthews (1960) notes the importance of personal relationships on legislative outcomes.
Social psychologists have also addressed personal relationships
2

See Milbrath (1963, 41) and Beny (1977, 212) for differences between tactics and strategies. Tactics refer to activities-meeting with legislators, testifying at hearings, or using
litigation-undertaken by lobbyists (see Baumgartner and Leech 1998). Strategies involve the use of these tactics in conjunction with relevant issues and the interest environment within which activities take place.
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in a number of contexts. According to Kelley and his colleagues,
"a close relationship is one of strong, frequent, and diverse interdepende nce that lasts over a considerable period of time" (1983,
38). And the key to personal relationships is that they involve
unique individuals who cannot be replaced if the relationship is
to be sustained (Hinde 1979). Hinde (1979) notes that relationships involve repeated interactions, whereby past encounters influence existing interactions, which in turn affect future
exchanges.
The good ale boy style of lobbying is an excellent example
of a relati onship that is personal in nature. Alan Ros enthal describes these good ale boys, "whose modus operandi is the three
Bs-bour bon , broads, and beefsteaks. These lobbyists are known
also as the ' old bulls;' their approach is that of the ' fixer.' They
are also ' full service lobbyists' because they try to take care of
the vario us needs of the legislators" (2001, 38) . There is no
doubt that this type of behavior has declined, and, in many states,
likely no longer exists at all due to reforms. For example, a number of scholars have looked at efforts to regulate lobbyists in recent years (Hunter, Wilson, and Brunk 1991; Brinig , Holcombe,
and Schw artzstein 1993; Lowery and Gray 1997; Rosenson
2005; Newm ark 2005; 2008). Still, lobbyists attend social events
with legislators, including a number of activities such as dining,
sports gam es, or travel (Rosenthal 2001). Though these observations are often derived from survey research or interviews, much
of these observations are anecdotal, and perhaps we do not fully
understan d the nature of these relationships.
UNDERSTANDING LOBBYING ROLES

Lobbyists engage in a number of activities in dealing with
their legislative counterparts, and the above discussion suggests
that many of these can be categorized as personal appeal strategies or information provision. For example, activities such as
VOL. 37 2008
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. dining or attending sporting events are clearly personal in nature.
Although the good ale boy style of lobbying may be a thing of
the past, personal relationships are still a necessary part of the
lobbying profession. Conversely, writing legislation, serving on
advisory boards, or providing information about policy implications are information-based tactics and are also common.
Thus, there are conceptually two constructs; but, how are
these constructs related? The first conception is that there is a
good deal of independence between these constructs. That is, we
can conceive of relationships along two dimensions based on
what the literature, lobbyists, and legislators tell us. The purpose
here is to assess empirically whether there are two constructs. A
long history of lobbying studies emphasizes the importance of
cultivating relationships and the critical role of lobbyists providing information to legislators. Nonetheless, these constructs are
not completely unrelated because of the enduring nature of relationships. Once a legislator accepts information from a lobbyist,
and that information is not misleading or erroneous, a relationship is fostered. The legislator will more easily trust the lobbyist
on the next exchange, which facilitates a more personal relationship and a greater degree of information acceptance in subsequent meetings. Trust is a crucial component in any personal
relationship (Cialdini 1993), friend or otherwise. Trust in the
individual will likely lead to trust in the information that that
person provides or in advice that they give. Even the good ale
boy style of lobbying required an element of trust, as a legislator
is unlikely to accept gifts from someone with whom they have
no confidence. Violations of this trust can also end a relationship.
Thus, the dimensions are not zero-sum, and in fact, having
personal ties should increase the likelihood of information provision. It is also likely that a lobbyist who uses both personal and
information-based appeal strategies is more likely to engage in a
THE JOURNAL
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greater variety of activities ranging from attending sporting
events to helping to draft legislation. Thomas and Hrebenar
(2004), for example, note the variability in tactics of lobbyists
today indicating that they rely on a host of direct and indirect
personal and information-based appeal strategies. Consider a
personal appeal strategy like dining with legislators, which is
clearly indicative of the good ole boy style of lobbying. It is
probable that a lobbyist who can combine infonnation based activities with personal tactics is more likely engage in any single
personal behavior. They should also engage in a greater number
of activities than someone who relies on only a personal or information based set of strategies. Similarly, drafting legislation
or serving on advisory boards should more likely occur if the
lobbyist can combine information based and personal appeal
strategies, rather than relying on only the former.
So, how does this fit into our understanding of lobbying
roles? Much of the early work on the profession viewed lobbyists as either amateurs or professionals. Zeigler and Baer
(1969) examined professionalism of both lobbyists and legislators and noted that lobbying was deemed a "margi nal occupation," which is evidenced by the fact that the U.S. Deprutment of
Labor did not even have a classification for the profession at the
time. They did, however, argue that lobbying professionalism
referred to skill in the profession, which was a function of lobbying experience; skill and experience increased the frequency of
interaction between these actors.
Bauer, Pool, and Dexter (1964) offer a description of professionalism in terms of the characteristics of certain corporations
that facilitate their lobbying efforts. Asking who the professionals were compared to the non-professionals, one interviewee in
their study reported, "You know, we are just amateurs at this
game." The professionals, on the other hand, are "People like the
Ford people. We just have a typewriter and a mimeograph maVOL.
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chine, and they have all sorts of money and resources" (342).
Thus, money and resources are critical for lobbying professionalism and information provision.
More recent research has further developed the concept of
lobbying professionalism. Rosenthal (2001) reports that there has
been an increase in full-time lobbying, the number of firms offering lobbying services, and an increase in specialization of
firms. In some states, these firms conduct a large share of the
lobbying activity in front of the state legislature (Gray and Lowery 1996). Contract lobbying has become more business-like,
and many firms believe they are advantaged by specialized services that they can offer their clients. Wright (1996) notes that
these "hired guns" may have better connections and greater
access to legislators. This fits into classifications of lobbying
types in Thomas and Hrebenar's (2004) on-going study of state
lobbying. These authors suggest that contract lobbyists are hired
for a fee, represent a multitude of clients, and often have experience in state government and in other lobbying activities. They
also classify in-house lobbyists as those who serve as a lobbyist
for a business, organization, or association; they typically have
experience in the field they represent. Another type, the legislative liaison, represents local, state, and federal agencies before
the legislature. Perhaps less professional are those lobbyists who
Thomas and Hrebenar (2004) classify as citizen or cause lobbyists or those who are ' self-styled' or lobby for pet projects.
lf lobbying appeal strategies are based on two dimensions,
perhaps we should rethink our classifications of lobbyists' strategies. Then we can consider how the different types of lobbyists
use different appeal strategies. From the perspective of the lobbyist, the best possible strategy is to use all available appeal
strategies when interacting with legislators. These individuals,
whom I have termed multi-tactic lobbyists, probably engage in a
variety of social activities like doing favors for legislators, meetTHE JOURNAL
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ing socially, or attending sporting events with them. They also
engage in information-based activities like providing information
on policy, helping to draft legislation, and serving on advisory
boards. Thus, the multi-tactic lobbyist likely has worked as a
lobbyist for a number of years, has had a long term relationship
with legislators, has frequent contact with them, and a few may
even have experience as a legislator. They are most likely ambitious and are ready to provide information for legislators who
seek information from them. In addition to having experience in
their profession, many of these lobbyists have established a network of contacts to help them achieve their objectives (Heinz et
al. 1993). The multi-tactic approach should most likely be used
by contract lobbyists or well-connected business executives because of the time they devote to the job and the resources that
they possess. Incidentally, they are probably the most professional lobbyists.
A second type of lobbyist, the good ole boy is likely described by the same set of personal characteristics as the multitactic lobbyist. This person probably knows the legislators well
and is often involved in social activities with them like dining
together or attending sporting events. The good ole boy lobbyist
may also have an extensive network of contacts both inside and
outside of the legislature. However, this person may exhibit a
slightly smaller set of behavioral characteristics than the multitactic lobbyists who has a greater variety of options at his or her
disposal. These lobbyists should favor highly personal social
activities.
A Hurd type of lobbyist relies on information based appeal
strategies rather than personal appeals. These are termed technocrats. Technocrats testify at hearings, help draft legislation, inform legislators of the effects of bills on their districts, and may
even influence appointments. They do not develop friendships,
probably because of state government reforms that have sought
VOL. 37 2008
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to regulate the behavior of both lobbyists and lawmakers (Newmark 2005; 2009). The technocrat lobbyist is more likely an inhouse lobbyist than contract lobbyists who may also have fostered personal relationships, or grass-roots lobbyist who uses
fewer personal or information-based appeals. In-house lobbyists
may not have developed a contact network in the legislature, but
they do have a great deal of experience in their issue-area (Thomas and Hrebenar 2004).
Finally, the amateurs possess few of the characteristics discussed herein. These individuals do not engage in lobbying professionally or full-time, and they are most likely grass-roots
lobbyists. They are likely weak lobbyists to whatever extent success depends on personal or information-based relationships with
legislators. In other words, they may be less proficient at their
jobs or may resemble the amateurs discussed by Zeigler and
Baer (1969). They are also less likely in-house or contract lobbyists because, for these types, lobbying is the focus of their
jobs.
EXAMINING THE NATURE OF LOBBYING RELATIONSHIPS

To examine the dimensionality and characteristics of lobbying, a survey was conducted of lobbyists in ten states. The ten
states-Delaware, Georgia, Iowa, Maine, Mississippi, Nevada ,
New Mexico, Ohio, Wisconsin, and Wyoming-were selected as
part of a larger study to obtain variation in size, region, and other
factors likely to characterize interest systems. The states vary in
the number of registered lobbyists and the extent to which the
profession is regulated. Lobby registration lists were acquired
from the relevant administrative agency in each state.3 The over3

Some states were avoided because lobbyists in those states were surveyed by a number
of scholars in recent years and their inclusion might limit the response rate. The number
of registered lobbyists varied in the ten-state sample from 166 in Wyoming to 1,459 in
Note continues
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all response rate for the entire sample was 36% or 432 total surveys out of the 1,250 sent. The response rate is consistent with a
number of other lobbying studies (Hrebenar and Thomas 1993;
Gray and Lowery 1996), and the rates across states are slightly
more consistent. The survey was designed to elicit infom1ation
on lobbying activities, including strategies and relationships with
key legislators with whom the lobbyist interacts. Since many
lobbyists represent a multitude of clients or interact with a number of legislators, the survey asked questions regarding interaction with the key legislators necessary to achieve the lobbyist ' s
goals.
The purpose is to create two indexes relating to personal relationships and information if the data support these theoretical
assumptions. The first dimension is an index derived from eight
of the survey questions pertaining to personal relationships.
These questions focus on characteristics of relationships, including activities that take place when individuals meet. Two of the
questions, "How friendly are your relationships with key legislators?" and "How often do you meet with key legislators at social
gather ings?, " are measured on a five-point scale ranging from
"never" to "extremely often." The remaining six questions are
similar to Schlozman and Tierney's (1986) questions pertaining
to lobbying tactics, where respondents were asked whether they
engaged in a variety of activities. The difference is that respondents were asked to indicate whether they engage in the activity

Ohio . The mean number of lobbyists was 643 (with a standard deviation of 381.36).
Approxima tely 125 lobbyists were randomly selected from each of the ten states . The
sampled lobbyists were typical of the lobbying population 's characteristics in each state
even in the states with a greater number of lobbyists. The response rates by state were as
follows: 36% in Delaware, 38% in Georgia, 35% in Iowa, 43% in Maine, 37% in Mississippi, 38% in Nevada, 32% in New Mexico, 33% in Ohio, 31% in Wisconsin, and 34% in
Wyoming. Thirty-four surveys were subtracted from the total because they were returned
undeliverable (some of these lobbyists were confirmed to have left the state).

VOL.

37 2008

12

NEWMARK

"often," "sometimes," or "not at all," 4 in order to differentiate
between the occasional lobbying behavior and activities that are
done more frequently. The six activities are (1) doing favors for
officials who need assistance, (2) engaging in informal contacts
with officials, (3) attending social events with legislators, (4)
dining with legislators, (5) attending entertainment such as sporting events or theater with legislators, and (6) attending the same
civic organizations such as Rotary, Lions Club, or Kiwanis
Clubs as legislators. The index ranges from 9 to 27 with a mean
of 17.24 and standard deviation of 3.55. The Chronbach's alpha
of 0.82 indicates a reliable measure.
The second dimension is another index constructed from
eleven survey questions pertaining to information-related activities. The first three questions are measured on a five-point scale
and ask (1) How frequently do you give technical information to
legislators about the issues before them?; (2) How frequently do
you give information to legislators on how the public views issues before them?; and (3) How frequently do you give information to legislators on how other legislators view the issues before
them? 5 A number of the Schlozman and Tierney (1986; cf.
Kollman 1998) style questions are also included, and again, respondents were asked whether they engaged in an activity "often," "sometimes," or "not at all." The activities are (1) testifying
at legislative hearings, (2) contacting government officials directly to present point of view, (3) helping to draft legislation,
(4) alerting state legislators to the effect of a bill on their district,
(5) consulting with governmental officials to plan legislative
4

Since the first two questions are coded on a 5-point scale, they have additional weight
compared to the six remaining questions. This is intentional because the first two questions focus on the core personal relationship, while the remaining six are more specific
personal activities.
5
Again, additional weight is given to these questions because they are central to the
information concept.
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strategy, (6) helping to draft agency regulations, rules, or guideline, (7) serving on advisory commissions or boards, and (8) attempting to influence appointments to public office . The index
ranges from 15 to 36, has a mean of 25.99, and has a standard
deviation of 4.07. The Chronbach's alpha of 0.74 indicates a reliable measure.
The survey also asked respondents how they would best characterize themselves as a lobbyist. A slight variant of the Thomas
and Hrebenar (2004) categories was used because academics and
survey respondents sometimes use different vernacular. The lobbyists were asked whether they were senior executives of their
organizations, in-house lobbyists, contract lobbyists, grass-roots
lobbyists, or some other type of lobbyist. Thirty-nine percent
indicated that they were senior executives (n = 165), 25% were
in-house (n = 106), 15% (n = 62) were contract lobbyists, and
14% were grass-roots lobbyists (n = 60). 6

Pers onal Relationships and Information-based Constructs
In order to determine whether there are two factors affecting
relationships between lobbyists and legislators, questions were
chosen based on their theoretical relevance for each of the constructs. Confirmatory factor analysis, which is often applied in
studies of scale measures (Kelloway, Catano, and Southwell
1992), is used to determine how well 19 indicators load on the
two factors . The loadings are found in Table 1.7 Half of the indicators have loadings above 0.80, and all are at least 0.42: (P5)
6

This is consist with other studies (Gray and Lowery 1996; Thomas and Hrebenar 2004).
The following eight indicators reflect the personal construct: (PI) how friendly are your
relationships with key legislators?; (P2) how often do you meet with key legislators at
social gatherings?; and whether the lobbyist (P3) does favors for officials, (P4) engages
in informal contacts, (PS) attends social events, (P6) dines with legislators, (P7) engages
in entertainmelll such as sporting events, and (P8) a/lends the same civic organizations.
7
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Attending social events loads at 0.93, the (J.'2)frequency of social
meetings loads at 0.86, (J.'6)dining with legislators has a 0.86
loading, and (J.'7) attending entertainment/sporting events loads
at 0.80. The loading for (J.'4) having informal contacts is 0.63,
and (J.'3) doing favors for officials has a loading of 0.59. Apparently, these are the driving force behind what constitutes
personal relationships, though all of the indicators are important. Two of the indicators-(Pl)
how friendly are relationships? and (J.'8) attends the same civic organization-have
relatively low loadings (0.44 and 0.42). But they are theoretically relevant to the personal construct, and not so small that
they should be excluded.
The eleven indicators for information provision are found
in Table 1.8 Seven of the eleven loadings are above 0.50, and
(113) contacting officials directly, (!16) planning legislative
strategy, and (!14) helping to draft legislation have reasonably
large path coefficients (0.79, 0.68, and 0.67, respectively). Other activities also appear to play an important role in information
provision such as (I12) testifying at legislative hearing (0.56),
(Il 5) alerting of [legislators of the] effects of bills on districts
(0.51), and (19) giving technical information (0.50).
Though the coefficient for (Il0) giving information about
the public is somewhat low (0.29), I have retained it in the index because there is some indication that lobbyists do provide
information to state legislators about constituents (Kollman
1998). There is strong theoretical reason for including this in the
8
These include (19)give technical information, (IIO) give information about public , (11I)
give infom,ation about legislators, (II 2) testify at legislative hearings, (113) contact
officials directly, (ll4) help draft legislation, (115)alert of effects of bill on district, (116)
plan legislative strategy, (I17) help draft agency regulations , (Il8) serve 011 advisory
boards , and (Il 9) influence appointments.
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model, and it is more desirable to leave it in because it is somewhat relevant rather than letting the data drive the specificatio n.9

Table 1
A Two-factor Model of
Pers onal Relation ships and Information Provision
Indicator
Pl
P2
P3
P4
PS
P6
P7
PS
I9
II0
II I
I12
Il3
Il4
I15
116
117
II 8
I 19

Description
Personal
How friendly are relationships?
0.44
How often meet socially?
0.86
Favors for officials
0.59
Informal contacts
0.63
Attend social events
0.93
Dining with legis lators
0.86
Entertainment , sporting events
0.80
Same civic organizations
0.42
Give technical information
Give information about public
Give informationabout legislators
Testify at legislative hearings
Contact officials directly
Help draft legislation
Alert of effects of bill on district
Plan legislative strategy
Help draft agency regulations
Serve on advisory boards
Influence appointments

Chi 2 923.57,

df=l51 , p=0.000,

RMSEA

Information

0.50
0.29
0.40
0.56
0.79
0.67
0.51
0.68
0.52
0.38
0.48
0.11

Completely standardized solutions

9

The Chronbach ' s alpha for the eleven indicators is 0.74, suggesting a reasonably reliable measure .
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The assumption is that the two constructs are actually latent
variables and that there is a causal structure linking these constructs to a number of observed variables (19 in this case). The
model includes two factors, one representing the personal construct, and the other representing the information provision. LISREL was used to construct the structural diagram depicted in
Figure 1. To estimate the model, polychoric correlations were
obtained for the 19 indicators. '0 I use maximum likelihood estimation, and the model converges in 43 iterations. The Chisquare statistic is 923.57 with 151 degrees of freedom, and the pvalue is 0.00 with a RMSEA of 0.11. This is better than the Chisquare statistic of 6,851.17, for the independence model with 171
degrees of freedom. The comparative fit index (Kelloway et al.
1992) is 0.88. Although slightly less than ideal, it does indicate
that the model fits the data reasonably well. The standardized
RMR is 0.096, which is.also acceptable.
The two factors are correlated at 0.45, which is expected because personal relationships likely increase the probability of
legislators accepting information (see Figure 1). Assuming that
lobbyists pursue a variety of strategies when interacting with
legislators, they will likely use both personal appeals and information based tactics to achieve their objectives. A Nevada lobbyist in this survey indicated this duality: "Our state has a citizen
legislature and meets only 120 days every two years. We have
ample time in the interim to work on issues, provide information,
assist with constituent issues, and generally schmooze elected
officials so we can be more effective."

'°

For categorical data, polychoric correlations are better at assessing the underlying
relationships among variables than Pearson product-moment correlations (Joreskog

1990).
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Figure 2
Single Factor Model of Relationships
l

have a common factor.) 11 These models did not fit the data better
than the original model and the correlation between the two factors typically dropped by only 0.02, from 0.45 to 0.43. Thus,
there is good support for the two-factor model.
11
When paths were freed to allow cross-loading , the resulting coefficients were particularly small . None of the loadings justified altering the specification. Specifications with
three factors fit poorly as well.
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Figure 1
A Measurement Model:
Personal Relationships a.nd Information Provision*
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*The comparative fit index (CF!) for this model was 0.88 compared to a 0.60 CF! for
the single-factor model in Figure 2.

Still, alternative specifications of the measurement model were
tested. Figure 2 contains the LISREL estimates of a single factor
model that has many small loadings and a generally poor comparative fit index of 0.60. The two-factor model is a better fit of
the data, however. (In an analysis not shown, I tested specifications where paths were freed and indicators were allowed to
VOL. 37 2008
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Distributionof PersonalRelationshipsand InformationProvision
So, what do these findings tell us about lobbying relationships and the extent to which lobbying tactics are personally
based or driven by information? Again, the mean personal score
for the 432 respondents was 17.2 (3.55 std. dev.) and ranged
from a low of 9 to a high of 27. The mean information provision
score was 26 for the entire sample and ranged from 15 to 36,
with a standard deviation of 4.07. Incidentally, no state varied
significantly from the overall mean for either measure, which
suggests similarity among the states. 12
But what do relationships look like for the entire sample?
Figure 3 is a scatterplot of the personal relationship and information provision indexes. The X-axis plots information provision,
and the Y-axis plots the personalization score. Points on the lower left indicate low scores on each dimension, while the upper
right corner shows those who had high scores on both. I have
two general comments on the pattern illustrated in Figure 3.
First, the pattern suggests that there is variance in the spatial locale of relationships such that the relationships are not predominantly located in one area of the diagram. In other words, the
relationships vary to the degree that they are personal and the
extent to which information is transferred between lobbyists and
legislators. Second, the distribution of these relationships is relatively symmetrical along the diagonal, and there are very few
outliers in the sample. However, nearly 37% of the respondents
fell in either the upper left quadrant (good ole boys) or the lower
right quadrant (technocrats).

12
The personal and information score are not meant for direct comparison to each other.
They are not standardized for ease of presentation and to allow a visual depiction of
where the data actually fall on the plot. Furthermore, state influences on lobbying are
outside the scope of this manuscript and are examined in another paper (Newmark 2009).
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Earlier, I developed a typology including four categories of
lobbyists based on the amount of information they convey and
the extent to which their relationships are personal. In order to
construct the diagram, respondents were divided above and beFigure 3
Scatterplot: Personal Relationships and
Information Provision
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The scatterplot uses a daisy wheel technique . A single respondent is denoted by
a circle, and additional spokes on the wheel are added for other respondents
who are located in the same space.

low the means on each dimension. 13 Respondents who scored
below the mean on both the personal and information dirnen13
The percentages listed in Figure 3 are partially driven by the decision regarding where
to make the cut-offs . On both dimensions, the means and medians were nearly identical,
so the means were chosen. Accordingly, those who scored above 17.23 were above the
mean on the personal dimension, and those at 17 and below were below the mean. On the
information dimension, those at 26 and above were above the mean of25 .99.
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sions are deemed amateurs and are found in the lower left quadrant of the plot. One-third of the 432 lobbyists surveyed fall
into this category. I suggested earlier that there has been a decline in the good ale boy style of lobbying, and according to the
classifications above, only 12% of the sample are labeled as
such. 14 These individuals scored above the mean on the personal
dimension, but below the mean on the information dimension.
They are located in the upper left corner of Figure 3. Nearly a
fourth of the sample scored above the mean on the technical dimension but below the mean on the personal dimension. These
individuals, labeled technocrats , are located in the lower right
quadrant of the plot. The final type includes the 30% located in
the upper right quadrant who scored above the mean on both dimensions. These individuals are labeled the multi-tactic lobbyist.
It is also likely that these types of lobbyists vary in their behaviors. Thus, I decompose the personal and information-based
constructs to draw some conclusions about the specific types of
behaviors in which these individuals engage. This allows an examination of the behavioral characteristics of lobbyists in absolute terms. Table 2 provides the deconstructed means for each
dimension and its deconstructed components for all the lobbyists
in the sample, as well as the means for each of the four lobbying
types. is
The multi-tactic lobbyist's mean scores for the constituent
parts of the personal dependent variable are presented in the table. This lobbyist had the highest mean for six out of the eight
components, and was tied for the highest mean for an additional
part of this construct. To name a few, the multi-tactic lobbyist
14
Unfort unately, given the nature of the cross-sectional data, it is not possible to draw
sr,:cific conclusions about just how much the go od ol e boys have declined .
1
By construction, we should expect higher means for certain lobbying types . The deconstructions do, however, allow us to examine the specific types of behaviors in which
lobbyists engage.
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Table 2
Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies

Dependent Variables followed
by deconstruction

Personal Dependent
How fiiendly are relationshipsj
How often Meet sociallyj
Favors for officials*
Informal contacts*
Attend social events *
Dining with legislators*
Entertainment, sporting events*
Same civic organizations*
Information Dependent
Give technical informationj
Give infom1ation about Publicj
Give informationabout legislatorsj
Testify at legislati ve hearings*

...,= -., ="' -...'""
-,:,2;

-,:,= - =
=2;""
E .,
"'
.,
""
""
r.,
< 2;
17.24
(3.54)
3.44
(0.70)
2.88
(0.94)
1.79
(0.63)
2.29
(0.61)
2.16
(0.63)
1.86
(0.64)
1.38
(0.54)
1.40
(0.55)
25.99
(4.07)
3 .52
(0.85)
2.75
(0.91)
2.50
(0.89)
2.29
(0.63)
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14.58
(2.08)
3.13
(0.67)
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(0.69)
1.47
(0.54)
1.96
(0.54)
1.78
(0.497
1.55
(0.51)

I.JO
(0.31)
1.23
(0.42)
22.10
(2.43)
3.12
(0.81)
2.41
(0.88)
2.10
(0.75)
1.96
(0.58)
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20.04
(t.95)
3.67
(0.59)
3.55
(0.58)
2.02
(0.52)
2.47
(0.58)
2.59
(0.50)
2.33
(0.47)
1.80
(0.54)
1.61
(0.61)
23 .06
(1.79)
2.96
(0.76)
2.31
(0.68)
2 . 18
(0.64)
2.00
(0.50)

15.09
(1.78)
3.24
(0.638
2.37
(0.77)
1.60
(0.53)
2. 17
(0.51)
1.86
(0.45)
1.50
(0.50)
1.10
(0.30)
1.25
(0.44)
28.49
(2.15)
3.98
(0.70)
3.00
(0.88)
2.71
(0.90)
2.58
(0.55)

d

20.89
(2.33)
3.86
(0.59)
3.64
(0.77)
2.26
(0.53)
2.72
(0.47)
2.67
(0.41)
2.33
(0.51)
1.79
(0.56)
1.63
(.62)
29.42
(2.42)
3.86
(0.68)
3.11
(0.90)
2.93
(0.89)
2.55
(0.56)
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Table 2
Variable Component Means by Lobbying Typologies

Dependent Variables followed
by deconstruction

Contact officials directly *
Help draft legislation*
Alert of effects of bill on district•
Plan legislative strategy*
Help draft agency regulations*
Serve on Advisory Boards*
Influence appointments*

• = variable

2.63
(0.52)
2.23
(0 .61)
2.40
(0 .61)
2.12
(0.63)
1.98
(0.67)
1.89
(0.70)
1.60
(0.62)

2.24
(0.51)
1.88
(0.54)
2.07
(0.62)
1. 74
(0.52)
1.71
(0.60)
1.60
(0.61)
1.26
(0.46)

2.51
(0.51)
2.10
(0.51)
2.20
(0.54)
1.96
(0.54)
1.67
(0.66)
1.61
(0.67)
1.55
(0.58)

2.87
(0.34)
2.45
(0.52)
2.67
(0.514
2.34
(0.54)
2.19
(0.677
2.05
(0.687
1.65
(0.592

2.93
(0.25)
2.52
(0.533
2.63
(0.52)
2.46
(0.56)
2.23
(0.60)
2.20
(0.65)
1.98
(0.61)

measured on a 1-3 scale .

T = variable measured on a 1-5 scale . The personal dependent variable ranges from 927 ; the information dependent variable ranges from 15-36. Number in parentheses is
the standard deviation . High means in bold ; low means are italicized

had the highest mean on survey questions dealing with how
friendly their relationships were, how often they met socially,
and whether they did favors for officials.
A similar pattern emerged for the multi-tactic lobbyist for
the information-based components of the second construct. In all
but three of the components of the information dimension, this
lobbyist had the highest mean score. For example, the multitactic lobbyist typically had higher scores for giving information
about constituents, giving information about the public, and serving on advisory boards. Moreover, the mean for influencing apVOL. 37 2008
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pointments was nearly a third of a point higher for the multitactic lobbyist than for any of the other categories of lobbyist.
Summarily, the multi-tactic lobbyist engages in a variety of activities that are both social in nature, as well as, a host of activities designed to convey information to legislators. They are likelikely the most adaptive lobbyists and are able to tailor their lobbying strategies to the environment. Table 3 illustrates that 41 %
of these individuals were senior executives of their organizations, 27% were in-house lobbyists, 23% were contract lobbyists,
and only 3% were grass-roots lobbyists. These first three categories typically have a great deal of experience in their professions
or in government (Thomas and Hrebenar 2004) and likely have
extensive networks to utilize in their lobbying efforts (Heinz et
al. 1993). Grass roots lobbyists probably lack the resources to
utilize the multi-tactic approach.
Looking at the components of the personal index, the good
ole boys had the highest mean for attending entertainment or
sporting events with legislators, and they tied for the highest
mean for dining with lawmakers (see Table 2). It is interesting
that these activities are among the most social of the personal
construct, and they may resemble the good ole boys of the past.
On the information-based construct, the good ole boys had the
lowest means for three out of the eleven components (second
only to the amateurs). Not surprising, the good ole boys were the
least likely to give technical information about policy, give information about the public, and help draft agency regulations.
Given our understanding of the behavior of these lobbyists (Rosenthal 2001), it would not be expected that they would provide
detailed policy information or possess the technical skills necessary to draft legislation or regulations. Since only 12% of the
lobbyists in the sample were considered good ole boys, it is likely that many lobbyists have recognized the importance of information in their relationships with legislators, and now attempt to
THE JOURNAL

OF POLITICAL

SCIENCE

THE NA TURE OF LE GISLA TOR/LOBB YIS T RELA TIONS

25

provide it. Still, the good ole boy lobbyists were most likely senior executives (37%), many were in-house lobbyists (31%), but
only 8% represented grass-roots organizations (see Table 3).
Notably, contract lobbyists represent only 16% of this type of
lobbyist, providing some indication that they are not just selling
their ability to facilitate personal relationships.
Table 2 suggests that the technocrat lobbyist likely provides
technical information on policy and is apt to testify at hearings or
alert legislators to the effects of bills on their districts. However,
the technocrat is also the least likely to dine with legislators,
and, along with the amateur, is equally unlikely to attend entertainment or sporting events with them. But again, this is expected because technocrats specialize in information provision,
rather than using personal appeal strategies. These lobbyists
were typically senior executives and in-house lobbyists, but less
likely represented grass roots organizations (see Table 3).
The amateur lobbyist lacks the personal and informationbased appeal strategies discussed throughout this paper, but just
how amateur are the amateurs? Table 2 shows that the amateurs
had the lowest means on nearly all of the components of both the
personal and information-based dimensions. With the exception
of dining with legislators and attending entertainment or sporting
events, the amateurs had lower means on the personal dimension
components than the other types of lobbyists.
Looking at the information dimension, the amateurs had the
lowest means for all of the components of that construct, with
the exception of giving technical information, giving information
about the public, and helping to draft agency regulations. Although the amateur lobbyists were often senior executives of
organizations (39%) or grass-roots lobbyists (24%), of the four
lobbying types, amateurs were less likely in-house lobbyists,
(18%) or contract lobbyists (9%) (see Table 3). This is not surpris ing since contract lobbyists or in-house lobbyists who might
VOL.

37 2008

26

NEWMARK

be classified as amateurs would not last long in their positions;
contrarily, I suspect many grass-roots firms to have nonprofessional lobbyists. Some senior executives may lobby for a
single issue (e.g. an anti-tax measure), and once the issue is addressed, they may have no further need to lobby.
Table 3
Lobbyist Type by Lobbyist Characteristic*
Characteristic

Amateur

Good Ole
Boy

Technocrat

Multitactic

Senior Executive

39.0

36.7

39.0

41.0

In-house

18.4

30.6

32.0

27.0

Contract

8.8

16.3

I 1.0

23.0

Grass-roots

23.5

8.2

13.0

3.3

Other

10.3

8.2

5.0

5.7

N

136

49

100

122

Cramer's V = .18
*Characteristics were derived from a survey question asking Which best Characterizes you as a lobbyist?

This analysis indicates that the multi-tactic lobbyists typically had the highest means on both dimensions. The multi-tactic
lobbyist typically had a higher overall mean on the personal dimension than the good ole boys (20.9 v. 20), and a higher mean
on the information dimension than the technocrats (29.4 v. 28.5).
On the other hand, the amateurs also had a lower overall mean
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on the personal dimension than the technocrats (14.6 v. 15.1),
and a lower mean on the information dimension than the good
ole boys (22.1 v. 23.1). This suggests that, from a strategic
standpoint, there is not necessarily a finite set of tactics that lobbyists can use in their interactions, where employing a personal
appeal diminishes the ability to use an information-based one.
Rather, it is possible that lobbying tactics complement each other, such that the lobbyists who are able to do favors for officials
or meet socially are also more likely to convey information by
testifying at legislative hearings, planning legislative strategy, or
drafting legislation. Or, once a legislator accepts information
from a lobbyist, a relationship develops for future interactions,
thereby facilitating a personal relationship. Conversely, the amateurs' inability to employ a given personal strategy seems to
make conveying information even more unlikely, and their inability to disseminate information appears to make forging personal relationships with legislators more difficult.
So, what type of lobbying has replaced the use of gifts and
expensive dinners as a means to gain access to state lawmakers?
Unfo rtunately, it is difficult to compare the number of good ole
boys today to their number in the past. However, the low percentage of good ole boys in this study suggests that they have indeed
decline d. Today, to do their jobs effectively, lobbyists appear to
add information-based appeals to their network of personal contacts . Others focus solely on information provision. Despite the
increas ed number of registered lobbyists in the states over the
past few decades, many lobbyists are not effective in using personal appeals or conveying information. This is indicated by the
fact that a third of the lobbyists in this study were deemed to be
amateurs. Still, this may be encouraging for those concerned
with democratic responsiveness, as it appears that a sizeable
number of lobbying registrants are non-professionals. Whether
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the average person can engage in lobbying and have an impact
on policy is another story.
CONCLUSION

What do these findings tell us about professional relationships? Perhaps a broader definition of professional relationships
is needed. We know that lobbyists use a variety of tactics to
achieve their objectives, ranging from going public (Kollman
1998) to testifying at legislative hearings (Schlozman and Tierney 1986; Nownes and Freeman 1998). If tactics or strategies
are perceived as weapons in a lobbyist's arsenal, they will use
whatever they have at their disposal to gain favor with legislators. A sizeable number of senior executives, in-house, and contract lobbyists use the multi-tactic approach. However, while the
good ale boy lobbyist might not provide large amounts of information, he would have a highly personalized relationship with
his legislative counterpart. Yet, this does not mean the relationship is not professional. Similarly, lobbyists who provide a great
deal of information could be perceived as having professional
relationships even if their relationships are not necessarily personal. So, professional relationships involve the effective use of
one or more lobbying tactic(s) in order to achieve objectives.
Professional lobbyists are more likely than amateurs to use direct
contacts in their lobbying (Zeigler and Baer 1969). A third of the
lobbyists who I have termed amateurs, likely do not have frequent, direct contact with legislators. Conversely, professional
lobbyists are able to use direct contacts involving both personal
and information-based appeals.
These relationship patterns may apply to other political actors as well. Thus, interactions between legislators and the governor or among law-makers and their constituents may involve a
similar dimensionality of personal relationships and information
provision. The successful use of these tactics probably plays an
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important role in determining political influence. Accordingly,
the obvious next step is to determine the effectiveness of various
lobbying tactics in influencing legislators or at least policy outcomes. Of course, this has been somewhat difficult to do in a
long line of research. These findings suggest that although there
is reasonable support that there are personal and information
based dimensions in lobbying, the ability to utilize one set of
strategies will facilitate the ability use another set. There may be
little additional time or monetary cost in pursuing multiple strategies, and even if there is an additional cost, it may be worth the
added investment.
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